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Abstract Signals regarding the behavior of others are an essential element of
human moral systems and there are important evolutionary connections between
language and large-scale cooperation. In particular, social communication may be
required for the reputation tracking needed to stabilize indirect reciprocity. Addi-
tionally, scholars have suggested that the beneﬁts of indirect reciprocity may have
been important for the evolution of language and that social signals may have
coevolved with large-scale cooperation. This paper investigates the possibility of
such a coevolution. Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we present a model
that incorporates primitive ‘‘moral signaling’’ into a simple setting of indirect rec-
iprocity. This model reveals some potential difﬁculties for the evolution of ‘‘moral
signals.’’ We ﬁnd that it is possible for ‘‘moral signals’’ to evolve alongside indirect
reciprocity, but without some external pressure aiding the evolution of a signaling
system, such a coevolution is unlikely.
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Introduction
Language is an essential component in human cooperative social systems, allowing
fast and efﬁcient information exchange in addition to facilitating social monitoring
and reputation tracking. Did the beneﬁts of social cooperation provide the selective
pressure that caused the evolution of moral language? And, could such a language
have evolved alongside social cooperation? To take a ﬁrst step in answering these
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-009-9175-9broad questions, we will examine the prospects for the evolution of primitive
‘‘moral signals’’ in the context of cooperation through indirect reciprocity.
The importance of reciprocity to the evolution of altruism was suggested by
Trivers (1971) and direct reciprocity has since received a considerable amount of
attention from scholars including the well-known computer simulations of Axelrod
(1984). Later, Alexander (1987) argued that indirect reciprocity also plays an
extremely important role in human moral systems. The idea is that an agent will
behave altruistically toward one person so that she will beneﬁt from altruistic acts of
others: if you scratch my back, someone else will scratch your back.
Recently, there has been enormous progress made on understanding how
cooperation through indirect reciprocity could have evolved. Most notably, Nowak
and Sigmund (1998b) have provided a simple model where agents may condition
their behavior on the ‘‘image’’ (or reputation) of other individuals. The model
includes a discriminating strategy, which selectively punishes those with poor
images. Such a discriminating strategy provides a sort of community enforcement
against defectors and thus enables the evolution of large-scale cooperation.
1
However, these basic models do not provide an explicit image-tracking
mechanism beyond direct observation. Nowak and Sigmund (1998b, 2005) suggest
informally that language may provide such a mechanism and that there may have
been a coevolution of social communication and indirect reciprocity. ‘‘The
evolution of human language as a means of information transfer has certainly
helped in the emergence of cooperation based on indirect reciprocity’’ (Nowak and
Sigmund 1998b). And, ‘‘Indirect reciprocity requires information storage and
transfer as well as strategic thinking and has a pivotal role in the evolution of
collaboration and communication’’ (Nowak and Sigmund 2005). This same
sentiment has been echoed by Sterelny (2003): ‘‘Language is superbly adapted
for social monitoring.’’ These ideas are also related to Joyce’s characterization of
the ‘‘gossip hypothesis’’ for the evolution of language: ‘‘…human linguistic
faculties were selected for in order to serve reciprocal exchanges when the groups
got large. A language of gossip is a language of reciprocity’’ (Joyce 2007).
2 The
evolution of language generally is too large a topic for this paper.
Instead, we will focus on the feasibility of a simultaneous evolution of primitive
social communication and indirect reciprocity. Classifying an individual, or her
actions, through language as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ would provide the reputation
tracking needed for indirect reciprocity to arise. And, given the sentiments
mentioned above, it is intuitively plausible that there could have been a coevolution
of indirect reciprocity and some social signaling system. Along these lines, Harms
and Skyrms (2008) have informally suggested that incorporating a simple signaling
game into the models of Nowak and Sigmund may provide the beginnings of an
1 Kandori (1992) was of the ﬁrst game theorists to study community enforcement.
2 The gossip hypothesis is motivated by studies of Aiello and Dunbar (1993), Dunbar (1993, 1996). It is
arguably far more nuanced than this quote suggests and is a very interesting and controversial topic that
demands a more detailed analysis than can be given in this paper. Here, we will restrict ourselves to the
general idea that the beneﬁt of large-scale cooperation was a major selective force in the evolution of
language.
34 R. Smead
123evolutionary account of ‘‘moral signals.’’
3 The idea is that a primitive social
signaling system, which tracks the behavior of individuals and facilitates
enforcement of cooperative norms, may be able to evolve in a setting of indirect
reciprocity. Such a signaling system would allow a population to reap the beneﬁts of
indirect reciprocity and may be representative of a primitive moral language.
It is surely true that language plays an important role in indirect reciprocity. Even
so, this does not necessarily mean that language evolved in this context or that it
evolved because of the beneﬁts gained by cooperation. One aim of this paper is to
gain some theoretical insight into the idea that the beneﬁt of large-scale cooperation
(by indirect reciprocity) was a major selective force in the evolution of language (as
social communication). By doing so, we will be able to form a limited assessment of
this claim’s plausibility.
To accomplish this, we will pursue the suggestion of Harms and Skyrms (2008)b y
modeling image scores as simple social signals between players and determine the
prospects for the coevolution of social signaling and indirect reciprocity.
4 This paper
will advancebeyond the current modelsofindirectreciprocity byexplicitlymodeling
the evolution signaling as a mechanism for reputation tracking. In the models studied
here, image scores will be determined by the signals of others and the signaling
strategies are also subject to evolution. This will provide a ﬁrst step toward an
understanding of the evolution of ‘‘moral signals’’ and allow us to theorize more
precisely about the effect of cooperative beneﬁts on the evolution of language.
Ultimately, we will see that there are ways cooperation and moral signals can
coevolve. However,withoutsomeadditional exogenouspressure on the signals in the
simplesettingsweconsider,suchacoevolutionisunlikely.Theseresultshighlightthe
difﬁcultiesfaced inprovidingtheoretical foundationsforthe claimthat the beneﬁtsof
indirect reciprocity were a driving force in the evolution of social communication.
The evolution of indirect reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity is when an individual A receives aid from another individual B
because A previously helped individual C.
5 The existence of this sort of behavior is
somewhat of a puzzle for evolutionary theorists. Direct reciprocity is less of a
puzzle, because the aid is coming from the person who received it and can be
withheld as punishment for previous uncooperative behavior. C may have an
interest in reciprocating with A because of beneﬁt from future interactions, but why
would B have any interest in facilitating cooperation between A and C by providing
3 The term ‘‘moral signals’’ is drawn from Harms and Skyrms (2008). The focal point of their discussion,
and the starting point for the model explored in this paper, is ‘‘cheap-talk’’ or cost-free signaling rather
than costly signaling. These games are explained in more detail in Section ‘‘Moral signals’’.
4 Including a signaling component in other games has produced some interesting results; see Skyrms
(2002, 2004) and Zollman (2005).
5 There are two varieties of indirect reciprocity. ‘‘Upstream’’ indirect reciprocity is when A lends aid to C
and because of that, B helps C. ‘‘Downstream’’ indirect reciprocity is when A lends aid to C and because
of that, B helps A. Both of these behaviors are seen in humans, but the focus of this paper is downstream
indirect reciprocity.
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the nature of the community and community enforcement. B will want to play her
role in this exchange so that she will elicit future cooperation from others.
Cooperation is sustained not by individual enforcement but by community
enforcement where the population behaves according a social norm of helping
those who give help.
The key to evolving cooperation through indirect reciprocity is an individual’s
image or reputation. Without some way for agents in the population to distinguish
between cooperators and defectors, there would be no way for indirect reciprocity to
work. Reputation provides a method of identifying cooperators. Nowak and
Sigmund (1998a, b) show that a simple binary image score which tracks only an
agent’s most recent action is sufﬁcient to allow for evolution of cooperation by
indirect reciprocity.
A simple model of image scoring
The model of Nowak and Sigmund (1998a, b) is simplistic relative to the actual
complexity of indirect reciprocity in humans. However, it reveals some important
and interesting aspects of indirect reciprocity and its evolution. We can imagine a
large population of players randomly paired a ﬁxed number of times in the role of
donor or recipient. The donor may choose to incur a cost c to give a beneﬁt b to the
recipient with b[c. Each player has an ‘‘image score’’ based on past actions. In the
simplest setting, there are only two image scores: ‘‘good’’ (or 0) which means the
agent donated on her last action and ‘‘bad’’ (or 1) which means the agent refused
donation on her last action.
6 There are three strategies: always donate (cooperate),
never donate (defect), and the image scoring strategy of donate if and only if the
other guy is ‘‘good’’ (discriminate).
A ﬁtness value is assigned to each strategy based on the accumulated payoffs of
the interactions. Differences in ﬁtness cause the proportion of each strategy in the
population to increase or decrease according to the replicator dynamics (Taylor and
Jonker 1978). These dynamics can be interpreted in either a biological context (as
differential reproduction) or in a cultural context (as differential imitation or
learning of strategies). On this model, cooperative states can evolve provided the
initial proportion of discriminators is high enough to drive the defectors to
extinction. The resulting cooperative populations are neutrally stable mixes of
discriminators and unconditional cooperators. Since these strategies are wholly
cooperative in the absence of defectors, each receives an identical payoff in these
states. Although this result does not necessitate cooperation, it does show that image
scoring strategies can stabilize it. Figure 1 provides a basic picture of the dynamics
of indirect reciprocity in the simple image scoring model.
7 This dynamical picture
closely resembles the situation with the evolution of direct reciprocity.
6 Nowak and Sigmund (1998b) also present a model with many image scores ranging from ? 5t o-5,
and ﬁnd that this setting is also conducive to the evolution of indirect reciprocity.
7 This ﬁgure was generated by simulations using the discrete-time version of the replicator dynamic
(Weibull 1995).
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are introduced. For instance, if there are errors in perception or action (i.e. the image
scores of other players cannot be reliably accessed or defection sometimes occurs
unwillingly), cooperation can be hindered and destabilized (Panchanathan and Boyd
2003; Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Brandt and Sigmund 2005a).
8 Additionally,
Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) have argued that the image scoring strategy is
‘‘paradoxical’’: why should discriminators punish others (by defecting) if they pay
the cost of having a damaged reputation themselves? To avoid these problems,
many have turned to the investigation of ‘‘standing strategies.’’ Standing strategies
attend to both the action performed and the circumstances in which it was
performed. This allows discriminators to treat defecting on defectors as a good thing
rather than a bad thing.
9 Many models have been provided which show the success
of standing strategies in stabilizing cooperation.
For our purposes here, we will focus only on the basic binary image scoring
model from Nowak and Sigmund (1998a). The primary motivation for this focus is
simplicity: models which include both second-order standing strategies and
signaling will be enormously complex, making any results very difﬁcult to interpret
properly. There are also empirical results that emphasize the importance of image
scoring. For instance, Milinski et al. (2001) examined indirect reciprocity
Fig. 1 The dynamics of indirect reciprocity
8 Fishman (2003) also discusses errors in action. He shows that a certain degree of ‘‘forgiveness’’ in the
discriminating strategy can stabilize cooperation, which becomes undermined with ‘‘complete ﬁdelity’’ in
image scoring. Additionally, Brandt and Sigmund (2005b) show that if the probability of errors in
perception decreases over an individual’s lifetime, cooperation can be stabilized.
9 The notion of a standing strategy was ﬁrst introduced by Sugden (1986). For more work on standing
strategies see Panchanathan and Boyd (2003), Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004), Leimar and Hammerstein
(2001), Nowak and Sigmund (2005).
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scoring strategies.
Setting aside standing strategies, there are two questions in the present context
that need to be answered regarding the simple image scoring model. Is it possible to
observe a coevolution of indirect reciprocity and the social signals that will serve as
a basic image-tracking mechanism? And, if such a coevolution is possible, what
implications does this have for the evolution of primitive ‘‘moral signals’’? To
answer these questions, we will introduce a simple signaling game into the model:
agents will send signals regarding the most recent behavior of others.
‘‘Moral signals’’
Harms and Skyrms (2008) describe the research project surrounding the evolution of
moral norms as having three connected explanatory targets: behavior in accordance
with norms, enforcement of norms by punishment, and ‘‘moral signals.’’ The ﬁrst of
two of these have received the vast majority of attention from scholars. The third
has been given very little formal treatment and the aim here is to advance our
understanding of this area by working with a simple model that connects a social
signaling game and the models of indirect reciprocity. It should be noted that
providing a full evolutionary account of moral language would be a massive
undertaking well beyond the scope of this paper; human moral language, and its
relationship to moral judgments and actions is far too complicated a phenomenon
for simple game theoretic models to account for. However, given the recent work on
indirect reciprocity and the evolution of communication in simple signaling games
we are in a position to take a ﬁrst step in advancing our understanding of this
particular feature of human moral systems.
Moral language and moral signals enable, among many things, (i) the
transmission of information about social behavior and (ii) the facilitation of
enforcement of social norms. Here we use the term ‘‘moral signals’’ (with quotes) to
designate this speciﬁc two-part role. In the models presented here, it will be possible
for the population to use the signals in a way that ﬁts with each of these parts. It is in
this limited sense that these models will allow us to analyze the feasibility of ‘‘moral
signals’’ evolving alongside indirect reciprocity. Determining if and how ‘‘moral
signals’’ can evolve in this setting will be an important part of two different
explanatory projects. The ﬁrst is explaining the evolution of moral norms. The
second is explaining the evolution of an image-tracking mechanism for indirect
reciprocity.
To model the evolution of ‘‘moral signals’’ a simple sender–receiver game
(Lewis 1969; Skyrms 1996) will be introduced into a binary-image model of
indirect reciprocity. The goal of the binary Lewis sender–receiver game is to match
one of two states of nature (observed by one individual) with a corresponding
correct action (taken by another individual) by means of sending one of two signals.
The game proceeds as follows. Nature chooses a state (left with probability q or
right with probability 1 - q). The sender observes the state and can send one of two
messages (A or B) to the receiver. The receiver observes the message (but not the
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matches the state (X for left, Y for right) and 0 otherwise. Figure 2 shows the
sender–receiver game in extensive form. Here, a signaling system is a set of
strategies that guarantees maximum payoff: one that is perfectly communicative.
There are two signaling systems in this game, and since there is no natural salience
to the signals, these solutions are ‘‘conventional.’’ In the evolutionary setting, where
a population is playing a signaling game and different strategies reproduce
according to relative success, selection will often lead to one of these conventional
signaling systems.
10
Once an evolving population reaches a signaling system equilibrium, the signals
used are primitive in that they are neither clearly indicative nor clearly imperative.
In such populations, signals are both perfectly correlated with the state of the world
and with the action taken in response. Thus, we can interpret a message in a
signaling system as either ‘‘Do X’’ or ‘‘the state is left’’ equivalently: they have
primitive content (Harms 2004) or are ‘‘Pushmi-Pullyu’’ because they ‘‘have both a
descriptive and directive function’’ (Millikan 2005). Harms (2000) argues that there
is good reason to think that basic ‘‘moral signals’’ are similar in this respect.
Intuitively, ‘‘moral signals’’ should both carry information about others and
facilitate certain behaviors toward them.
In the model presented below, a signaling game structure will be imbedded in the
setting of indirect reciprocity and agents will communicate about other individuals
rather than about the state of the world. Individual A is able to send messages
regarding their past interaction partner B to B’s future interaction partner C.
Very few models have attempted to explicitly capture the evolution of such social
communication. One such study is done by Nakamaru and Kawata (2004), who
examine a model of indirect reciprocity that includes a form of communication they
call ‘‘rumors.’’ Their model includes strategies for starting and spreading rumors
Fig. 2 Sender–receiver game in extensive form
10 For more recent work on evolution in simple signaling games of this sort see Skyrms (1996, 2002,
2004), Zollman (2005), Huttegger (2007a, b), Barrett (2008).
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detect and punish defectors. Additionally, which strategies are able to repel cheaters
depends on the rate of communication in the population. The model presented in
this paper will differ from that of Nakamaru and Kawata (2004) in several ways. In
particular, Nakamaru and Kawata examine a more restricted set of signaling
strategies in addition to including complexities such as variation on the rate of
rumor communication, rumors about oneself, and the possibility of repeating play
with a single individual. The model below will avoid these complexities and focus
on a more direct form of communication without placing restrictions on the
signaling strategies. Not restricting the strategy space, as we will see in the section
‘‘Including a payoff to signaling’’, allows for different methods of ‘‘moral
signaling’’ to evolve that are similar to the different conventions of the Lewis
sender receiver-games.
The model
The base game for the model presented here will be the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
11 The
payoff matrix shown below will provide a payoff function p, which will map a pair of
strategies to a payoff.
12 In this model, members of an inﬁnite, randomly mixing
population will play a ﬁxed number N of 1-shot games, each against a new opponent.
In each interaction, players choose to either cooperate (c) or defect (d). Then, both
players will have the opportunity to send a signal to the next player who interacts
with her current opponent (either 0 or 1). We will begin by investigating the case
where there is no direct beneﬁt or cost associated with sending particular signals.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
cd
c 10,10 0,11
d 11,0 1,1
A strategy here is an ordered pair of functions (R,S). R maps signals to actions:
{0,1} ? {c,d} dictating how the player will act in the stage game. S maps actions to
signals: {c,d} ? {0,1} dictating what the player will signal about her previous
opponent.
13 Let Strat represent the set of all strategies. There are 16 strategies in all,
which can be represented as ordered quadruples such as (c,d,0,1) meaning ‘‘do c if
11 The payoffs here can be varied while preserving ordinal ranking and produce similar results. For the
simulations, these speciﬁc payoffs were chosen because they capture the general structure of cooperative
or altruistic games while offering a substantial beneﬁt to settling on the cooperative outcome.
12 The game used by Nowak and Sigmund (1998a, b) is similar to a Prisoner’s Dilemma if we take the
expected payoffs for a 50% chance of being a donor and a 50% chance of being a receiver for each
interaction.
13 The signaling component of a strategy will be referred to as ‘‘separating’’ if it sends different signals
for different actions.
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otherwise.’’ Additionally, each player p in round n will have an image score kp
n
[{0,1} that is determined by the signal of their previous opponent q. When players
interact, each responds to the image of her opponent and receives a payoff according
to the game matrix above. Then, after the interaction, each player gives their
opponent a new image before going on to new interactions. For simplicity we will
assume that all players have an initial image score of 0.
14 Note that the signal q
sends about p depends on the strategy of q and the action of p (which is a reaction to
q’s image). Thus, knþ1
p ¼ SqðRpðkn
qÞÞ and the payoff to p for an interaction with q on
round n is then pðRpðkn
qÞ;Rqðkn
pÞÞ:
15
The payoff of one strategy type i against another j cannot be calculated for a
particular interaction without knowing the image scores of each individual, which
depend on the other types in the population. Consequently, each round we calculate
the probability that a given type has a particular image based on expected
interactions in the previous round of play. We then calculate the expected utility of
strategy i against strategy j under all possible image score combinations by
weighting the payoffs with the appropriate probabilities. Let u
n(i,j) denote the
expected utility of using i against j in round n.
Individuals will play a ﬁxed strategy and we are interested in the evolution of the
strategy frequencies in a population. The ﬁtness of a strategy type i in round n is
based on the expected payoffs against the population in that round:
f n
i ðXÞ¼
X
j2Strat
unði;jÞxj
where xj represents the proportion of strategy type j in the population and X
=( x1…x16) represents the current distribution of all strategy types in the population.
The total ﬁtness for the game fi(X) is the sum of the ﬁtness from all rounds of play:
fiðXÞ¼
P
n f n
i ðXÞ: Calculating total ﬁtness involves calculating rounds one by one
while tracking the image scores generated from previous rounds.
In simulations, evolution occurs according to the discrete time replicator
dynamics. The idea is that the strategies with higher ﬁtness increase at the expense
of those with lower ﬁtness:
xi
0 ¼ xi
fiðXÞ
hðXÞ
  
where h is the average ﬁtness of the population and xi
0 is the frequency of type i at
the next time step.
16
14 This adds a natural asymmetry into the model where some strategies start out cooperative (without
information), others do not. For instance, since all individuals begin with an image of 0, the strategy
(c,d,0,1) cooperates in the absence of information and (d,c,1,0) defects. As will be discussed in the section
‘‘Including a payoff to signaling’’, this can lead to the evolution of different possible ‘‘moral systems.’’
15 It is easy to see that the effect of the signal from a player’s ﬁrst opponent may have ongoing effects
several rounds later; to determine the outcome of a particular interaction, the histories of the players are
needed. Because of this complexity, the game being played involves many individuals and is too complex
to be represented in a simple form.
16 Interested readers may contact the author for further details on the computer simulations.
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It is important to brieﬂy discuss the interpretation of signals in this model. The
signals ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’ do not have any predetermined meaning such as ‘‘good’’ or
‘‘bad.’’ However, in certain populations these signals can come to have primitive
content in the sense described above. For instance, in a population of (c,d,0,1) the
signal of ‘‘1’’ regarding an individual A could be loosely translated as ‘‘A defected;
defect on A.’’ This same population is highly cooperative, able transmit information
about individuals, and able to use that information to punish (via defection) any
non-cooperative behavior. Thus, the population would be using ‘‘moral signals’’ in
the limited sense we are working with.
17
Admittedly, this is an oversimpliﬁed model of human moral systems. Real
societies differ in several ways; they have more complex interactions, more
complex communication, and nuanced differences between reputation and moral
standing. Despite these idealizations, however, we can use these models to get a
sense of what factors may (or may not) be involved in the evolution of primitive
social signals. Furthermore, ﬁrst attempts at modeling social phenomena should
focus on simple settings so as to gain a deeper understanding of the underlying
dynamics before further complexities are introduced.
Within this model and various extensions considered below, we can determine
how likely it is for indirect reciprocity to evolve alongside a system of ‘‘moral
signals.’’ We can also provide an account of the important factors in such a
coevolution. This is the topic of the next two sections. If it turns out that ‘‘moral
signals’’ evolve only very rarely or that their evolution requires substantial pressure
from outside the domain of indirect reciprocity, then this may (in the absence of
further modeling) give us a reason to doubt the importance of indirect reciprocity in
the evolution of primitive moral language.
Signaling as reputation tracking?
In order to understand the results of the model, it is important to set a benchmark for
comparison. Here, we will use the results of the simple binary-image models of
indirect reciprocity for comparison. If we include only strategies that agree on
signaling behavior and correspond to the cooperator (c,c,0,1), the discriminator
(c,d,0,1), and the defector (d,d,0,1), Fig. 3 shows we can achieve similar results to
Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) (compare to Fig. 1). On the model presented above,
with N = 5 and the payoff structure given, simulations show that 79% of populations
reach some sort of cooperative equilibrium which is a mixture between discrimi-
nators and cooperators. A population will be counted as cooperative if the majority of
the interactions are cooperative. We can now compare this benchmark case to cases
that include a variety of additional signaling strategies. This allows us to judge the
17 One may object that there is no need to interpret these signals normatively. Even so, the behavioral and
social role that ‘‘moral signals’’ are playing in these populations is at least one important aspect of human
moral systems worthy of philosophical investigation.
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cooperation.
With the introduction of a signaling component, there are two new complications
that could cause problems for the evolution of indirect reciprocity. The ﬁrst
complication is strategies that have an ‘‘inverted’’ view of what the signals mean
relative to the population. Consider (d,c,0,1) relative to our benchmark case. This
strategy has the same signaling behavior as the other strategies in the population, but
defects on cooperative players and cooperates with the defectors. The second
complication is strategies that signal in ways that would disrupt reputation tracking,
such as always sending one signal or sending the opposite signals relative to the rest
of the population. In general, the worry is that having an indeterminate signaling
system serving as the mechanism for reputation tracking will, in effect, introduce
errors in perception of image scores and destabilize cooperation as seen by
Panchanathan and Boyd (2003).
Simulation results
These simulations were done using the discrete time replicator dynamics, a random
initial distribution of strategy types in the population, the payoffs presented above,
and N = 5 rounds of play. Table 1 shows the tendencies for cooperative outcomes
when we include different sets of strategies. The ﬁrst thing to note is that when we
include the strategy which inverts the behavior of the traditional discriminators
(d,c,0,1), even without including strategies that differ in their signaling behavior,
there is a dramatic effect on the prospects for reaching cooperative states. Although
this strategy does not survive in any resulting states, its presence certainly changes
the evolutionary picture, hindering the evolution of cooperation by indirect
Fig. 3 The dynamics of indirect reciprocity
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in cooperative states only 39% of the time.
Turning to the other possible complication—including different signaling
strategies within the population—reveals that the prospects for a coevolution of
signaling and indirect reciprocity are very grim. If we suppose that just the defectors
signal in a way to disrupt the reputation tracking (d,d,1,0) then cooperation is hurt
but still evolves a large portion of the time (48%). However, when all the strategies
are included, the results for cooperation by indirect reciprocity are disastrous. Only
5 populations in 1,000 simulations reached cooperative states. To make things even
worse, none of these ‘‘cooperative’’ states were efﬁcient (average payoff of 10 per
interaction), meaning that there was occasional defection.
The difﬁculties for cooperative populations are not entirely due to defecting
individuals. Cooperative individuals who disrupt the image tracking signals can
destabilize indirect reciprocity. For instance, one strategy that is particularly
troublesome relative to the strategies in our benchmark case is the ‘‘Two-Faced’’
strategy which always cooperates, but always signals ‘‘1’’ (c,c,1,1). In a population of
discriminators of type (c,d,0,1), a player using the Two-Faced strategy undermines
the reputation of others without ever harming her own image. This allows the Two-
Faced strategy to invade by causing the discriminators to begin defecting on each
other and thereby paving the way for defectors to take over. Figure 4 shows the
evolutionary dynamics on the face of the simplex which has only Two-Faced
cooperators (c,c,1,1), signaling discriminators (c,d,0,1) and signaling defectors
(d,d,0,1). Simulations involving only these three strategies result in uncooperative
populations every time. This reveals that not only does the presence of communi-
cation errors undermine cooperation, as shown by the perception errors examined by
Panchanathan and Boyd (2003), but that the situation is much worse: an error-
causing strategy can invade a population of error-free discriminators.
With all possible strategies present, the only populations that reached cooperative
states were those that began with a very high proportion of strategies labeling
cooperation with ‘‘0’’ and defection with ‘‘1’’. In this simple model, without some
way to police signals and enforce conformity to a separating signaling system, the
prospects for the coevolution of reputation tracking signals and indirect reciprocity
are bleak. This shows that the introduction of cheap-talk is detrimental to the
evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity because of reputation-ruining
signals. If ‘‘moral signals’’ are to evolve in this setting, we will need to either
examine a more complicated model that allows for a way to police the signals or
Table 1 Simulation results
Strategies % Cooperative Efﬁcient?
(c,c,0,1), (c,d,0,1), (d,d,0,1) 79 Yes
(c,c,0,1), (c,d,0,1), (d,d,0,1), (d,c,0,1) 39 Yes
(c,c,0,1), (c,d,0,1), (d,d,1,0) 48 Yes
All strategies \1N o
(c,c,1,1), (c,d,0,1), (d,d,0,1) 0 No
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These extensions will be explored in the next section.
Including a payoff to signaling
The problems for indirect reciprocity that arise when we explicitly model image
tracking by cheap-talk are due to the fact that there is no cost or beneﬁt directly tied
to signaling. Individuals are not accountable, in terms of payoffs, for the signals
they send regarding others. This is the reason that the discriminator (c,d,0,1) can be
invaded by the Two-Faced cooperator (c,c,1,1). We can augment the model above
by introducing such a payoff or cost associated with the signals. There are two ways
this can be done. First, we can impose a variety of additional payoff (or cost)
structures associated with the signaling strategies that are exogenous to the setting of
indirect reciprocity. Second, we can introduce nuances to the interaction/signaling
structure that would allow signaling itself to be rewarded or punished endogenously
in the setting of indirect reciprocity. We will consider both of these possibilities.
Exogenous payoffs
Here, we consider three possible ways to include an exogenous payoff structure for
signals.First,onesignalmaysimplybeinherentlycostlytosend.Second,theremaybe
a direct reward associated with using a particular separating strategy such as labeling
cooperatorswitha‘‘0’’anddefectorswitha‘‘1.’’Third,wecanallowforacoevolving,
common interest signaling game to serve as the signaling system for representing the
images of players. Each of these possibilities will be discussed below.
Fig. 4 Problems with the Two-Faced strategy
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perhaps sending messages about others is difﬁcult or time consuming (and ‘‘0’’ is
simply not saying anything), or perhaps there are social consequences for sending
signal 1 that we wish to lump into a single exogenous cost for simplicity. Whatever
the reason, altering the model in this way will stabilize strategies such as (c,d,0,1)
from the Two-Faced cooperator, since (c,c,1,1) requires sending the costly signal.
18
If we simulate evolution in this setting, we see that efﬁcient cooperative states do
sometimes arise, but that it is a rare occurrence. For a cost of 0.5 for every use of
signal 1, only 6 of 1,000 populations reached cooperative states and all were mixes
of (c,c,0,0), (c,c,0,1), (c,d,0,0) and (c,d,0,1). Results in simulations for other cost
amounts (ranging from 0.1 to 1.0) are similar. And, for an even higher cost of 2.0,
no cooperative outcomes were observed in 500 simulations.
Alternatively, it is possible that there is some external pressure to communicate
in a particular way: perhaps as pressure from the linguistic community to conform to
an already established signaling system used in other settings. In this case, we can
give a one-time beneﬁt x to signaling ‘‘correctly’’ relative to this external standard,
which we will stipulate as labeling defectors with a ‘‘1’’ and cooperators with a ‘‘0.’’
In simulations, this beneﬁt is given to agents only once each generation and the
effect of increasing this beneﬁt is dramatic. With a relatively small one-time beneﬁt
of x = 1, we ﬁnd that cooperative populations are stabilized and efﬁcient, but
relatively infrequent at approximately 5% compared to the baseline of 79% seen
above. Table 2 shows that the proportion of resulting cooperative populations
increases as the beneﬁt to correct signaling increases, but even with a substantial
bonus of x = 15 (the maximum payoff from a given stage game play is 11) it is still
much more difﬁcult to get cooperation than in the benchmark case.
The third form of exogenous payoffs that we could introduce involves a
coevolving signaling game. The basic motivation behind this is that individuals may
be unable to distinguish between image signaling and a different game of common
interest signaling as in Fig. 2. Thus, each individual’s strategy in the indirect
reciprocity setting would double as a strategy for a simple common interest
signaling game. Here, there are two states of the world (left and right) that occur
with equal probability. One player observes the state and sends a signal (0 or 1). The
other player then observes the signal and acts accordingly (c or d). If c is chosen in
the left state each get a payoff of y and if d is chosen in the right state each get a
payoff y, otherwise each receive no payoff.
In this case, we ﬁnd that there are two cooperative states possible: all (c,d,0,1) or
polymorphic mixes involving (c,c,1,0) and (d,c,1,0). The former is optimal, the
latter is not. One could interpret these two possible outcomes as different varieties
of moral systems. In the ﬁrst, members assume players are cooperative until
defection is detected. In the second, there is a mix of altruists and discriminators
who assume others are defectors until they get a signal that says otherwise.
Furthermore, they have different signaling systems (or different moral languages)
18 To avoid negative ﬁtness values, which cannot be computed in the discrete-time replicator dynamics,
this ‘‘cost’’ to signal 1 is calculated by giving a small beneﬁt whenever an individual chooses not to send
the signal. Since the dynamics are governed only by relative ﬁtness, this beneﬁt for some strategies is
equivalent to a cost for others.
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19 Table 3 shows the effect of increasing
the signaling payoff y. As before, increasing this payoff increases the proportion of
cooperative outcomes.
20
All three variations of exogenous payoffs for signaling can stabilize cooperation
by indirect reciprocity and plausibly allow an image-tracking signaling system to
coevolve with cooperation. Interestingly, we have also seen that some exogenous
payoffs to signaling may cause different populations to evolve different uses of
‘‘moral signals’’ and corresponding ‘‘moral norms.’’ One could, however, question
the signiﬁcance of these results, arguing that introducing an exogenous payoff
structure merely pushes the questions of coevolution back: where do such
exogenous payoffs come from and why should they apply to cases of indirect
reciprocity? This is a fair criticism, and surely whether or not introducing a
particular additional exogenous payoff structure is justiﬁed will depend on what is
being modeled, how we interpret the payoffs, etc. Regardless, one conclusion that
can be drawn is that an appropriate exogenous payoff structure for signaling,
wherever it comes from, would aid the coevolution of signaling and indirect
reciprocity. Perhaps it is important that there be such exogenous pressure for a
successful system of ‘‘moral signals’’ to evolve.
To avoid the open questions raised by exogenous payoffs, it is important to also
examine models that impose a payoff structure on the signals within the setting of
indirect reciprocity itself. The next extension considered will model such an
endogenous payoff to the signaling strategies. The idea is that sending signals in a
manner different from others may elicit a form of signal-retaliation and the signaler
herself may put her image at stake when making claims about others. If this
additional complication can allow for stable social signaling which enables
cooperation through indirect reciprocity, we will have at least one setting where
exogenous payoffs are not required for the evolution of a simple system of ‘‘moral
signals.’’
Table 2 Effects of introducing a bonus to ‘‘correct’’ signaling
Correct signaling bonus x = 1 x = 5 x = 10 x = 15
% of cooperative populations 4.7% 33.7% 43.0% 47.5%
Table 3 Effects of increasing payoff from a coevolving signaling game
Successful signaling payoff y = 1 y = 5 y = 10
% of cooperative populations 5.8% 31.5% 61.0%
19 The difference in these two systems is due to the different signaling conventions. The reason the
outcomes are asymmetric is due to the asymmetry in the game mentioned above: all players begin with an
image of ‘‘0.’’
20 The situation is somewhat different than before. As the payoff y gets very large, the game of indirect
reciprocity will cease to matter and the signaling game will simply dominate determination of ﬁtness.
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On the standard picture of indirect reciprocity, acting cooperatively will elicit
future cooperation from others. It is possible that signaling a certain way may be
something that also elicits future cooperation (or defection). To explore this
possibility, we will introduce an additional layer of signaling into the model. As
before, agents meet in one-shot games and send signals regarding the actions of
their opponents. Now, an interaction between two agents (say A and B) as well as
the signal sent (by B) are observed by another member of the population (C) with
probability q. C may then send a signal regarding B, changing B’s image. If B’s
signal matches what C would have sent regarding A, C labels B as a cooperator
(‘‘0’’ or ‘‘1,’’ whatever that would be for C). If B’s signal did not match, C gives
B the label that corresponds to defection. The idea here is that if agents signal
according to your strategy, they are seen as cooperative, and if they signal
differently, they are seen as uncooperative. Can this new element of the model
stabilize cooperation and the signaling system necessary for image-tracking?
Simulations bring both good news and bad news.
The good news is that, with q = 0.1, simulations show that the answer here is
yes! This new element does create an endogenous beneﬁt which serves to eliminate
strategies that created problems for cooperation, such as the Two-Faced strategy.
The cooperative populations that arise are a stable mix of discriminators and
altruists, and tend to agree on signaling.
21 Moreover, all the resulting cooperative
populations are optimal. The only other stable states seen in simulations are mixes
consisting of various defecting strategies. This result reveals that it is possible for an
image-tracking signaling system (‘‘moral signaling’’) to evolve in the context of
indirect reciprocity, for that system to make indirect reciprocity possible, and for
that system to be the mechanism for its own enforcement. However, there is reason
to be cautious before concluding much more.
The bad news is that, while this is possible, it does not appear likely. The
resulting populations reaching cooperative states (with N = 5 and q = 0.1) was just
under 2% of the total simulated populations.
22 The beneﬁt to endogenous signaling
is not signiﬁcant enough to push more than a small number of populations to
cooperative states. Thus, this way of making the payoffs to signaling endogenous
reveals a possible coevolution of signaling and indirect reciprocity. But, without
some additional exogenous pressure on signaling, cooperation is far less likely to
evolve than in the benchmark image scoring setting.
21 Some of the members in the stable cooperative populations send the ‘‘cooperative’’ signal of ‘‘0’’
regardless of opponent action. But, in these populations these strategies are never seen deviating from
others, since everyone is in fact cooperating.
22 There are various ways to increase the prospects for cooperation here. For instance, decreasing the
beneﬁt to defection to 0.1 (rather than 1) increases the proportion of cooperative populations to 30%.
Another possibility is to increase the number of rounds of play. But in any case, there is a large decrease
relative to the baseline case involving only (c,c,0,1), (c,d,0,1), and (d,d,0,1). Increasing q does not have a
large effect.
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There are several possible variants on the model presented in the previous section
that would, intuitively, improve the prospects for the coevolution of ‘‘moral signals’’
and indirect reciprocity. A few of these are brieﬂy described below along with
simulation results.
Evolution of behavior in Stag Hunts or Coordination Games in standard settings
is much more likely to result in cooperation than in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Using
one of these games as our base game in the model above does make the evolution of
cooperation more likely. However, the signaling portion of the model has virtually
no effect on the evolution; and the resulting populations do not favor one signaling
strategy over another. The reason is obvious: in these games, there is no need to
‘‘enforce’’ cooperation once the population is cooperative because it is strictly
harmful to behave in another way. Therefore, there is no need to track reputation for
enforcement purposes.
Another possibility that could affect the evolution of cooperation and ‘‘moral
signals’’ is a bias toward ‘‘truth-telling’’ in the initial populations.
23 Introducing
such a bias will, of course, have an effect. However, a small bias only slightly
increases the basin of attraction, and a relatively large bias is needed to create
substantial changes. Even with truth-telling strategies being, on average, ﬁve times
more likely than other strategies, only 23.6% of simulations resulted in cooperation.
This means that if an initial bias is to help the coevolution of cooperation and
‘‘moral signals’’ it will have to be quite large, which cannot be justiﬁed within the
scope of this model.
24
Finally, perhaps there are restricted strategy sets, which can be justiﬁed, that will
dramatically increase the likelihood of the coevolution of cooperation and ‘‘moral
signals.’’ Making such modiﬁcations certainly has an arbitrary feel, but even if they
are justiﬁable, such restrictions typically do not have a dramatic effect. For example,
if we exclude any strategy that responds to ‘‘0’’ with d and ‘‘1’’ with c as well as any
strategy that signals ‘‘1’’ for c and ‘‘0’’ for d, we still see only a very small
proportion of cooperative signaling populations evolve (only 6 of 500 simulated
populations).
In general, the result that the coevolution of indirect reciprocity and moral
signaling is unlikely (relative to the benchmark case) seems relatively robust with
respect to variations in the model. This can be taken as providing indirect theoretical
support, in at least these simple settings, for the following claim: if language is to
play the role of reputation tracking, the selective pressure for its evolution must
come from outside the arena of indirect reciprocity.
23 The initial distribution in the strategy space is chosen randomly by selecting a number rj at random
from the interval (0,1) for each strategy j and then setting the proportion of type i in the population to be
xi ¼ lnðriÞ=
P
j  lnðrjÞ . An initial bias in the direction of truth-telling can be represented by
substituting  clnðriÞ for  lnðriÞ if i is a ‘‘truth-telling’’ strategy where c[1 is a constant representing
the strength of the bias. For the results presented here c = 5.
24 Bias may also be introduced into the dynamics itself in the form of a conformist bias (Skyrms 2005).
Exploring different dynamics in this setting would be an interesting topic for future work.
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The coevolution of signaling and indirect reciprocity is not straightforward. The
simple models examined here have provided a starting point for investigating the
evolution of ‘‘moral signals’’ and the role they play in our moral systems. The most
direct method of modeling such coevolution reveals that some method of policing
the use of signals will be needed; without such a method, troublesome strategies
such as the ‘‘Two-Faced’’ cooperator may destabilize cooperative populations.
We can introduce an endogenous payoff to signaling, which shows that it is
possible for an image-tracking signaling system (‘‘moral signals’’) to coevolve with
indirect reciprocity. In this case, however, cooperation is not likely to evolve and it
seems improbable that a coevolution of signaling and indirect reciprocity would
occur without some additional exogenous payoff structure directly related to the
signaling. Thus, for the use of ‘‘moral signals’’ to evolve in this setting, it is
important that signals be subject to selective pressure apart from indirect
reciprocity. Furthermore, when such exogenous pressures are included, interesting
possibilities arise. Different populations can evolve different ‘‘moral systems’’ that
vary in the way they use ‘‘moral signals.’’ These simple models show that even if
moral language plays a crucial role in cooperation through indirect reciprocity, it
does not follow that this setting has provided the selective pressure driving the
evolution of a moral language.
More generally, these results have implications for the claim that the beneﬁt of
large-scale cooperation was a major selective force in the evolution of social
communication. We found that either (i) ‘‘moral signals’’ can evolve but only as an
unlikely accident of the starting point of the evolutionary process, or (ii) ‘‘moral
signals’’ are likely to evolve but only when there is selective pressure from outside
the arena of indirect reciprocity. In either case, these simple models cast doubt on
the claim above. If the claim is to be supported theoretically, an alternative model of
the evolutionary process will need to be provided. Whether or not such a model can
be provided is an open question, but the simple models examined here have
highlighted the difﬁculties involved in giving a positive account.
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